Read the patchnotes in the game's website: https://thecycle.game/news-and-media/the-cycle-frontier-patch-3-4-0
The game will go into maintenance tomorrow 7th June 2023 at 08:00am CEST and the game will be inaccessible for a few hours.

Hello Prospectors!
Patch 3.4.0 has been cooking behind the scenes for a little while now, and it's finally ready to be served. Complete with seasonings, a tall drink, and a few changes that might catch your interest, we're following up on some changes from 3.2 and 3.3 while also addressing some issues that have been highlighted by our community. On the menu today will be additional AI changes, a balance pass on some of our early game weapons, the usual stomping of a few pesky bugs and exploits, an adjustment to Tharis storm cycles, and yes, an adjustment to Progenitor Slags. We recently discussed in our Discord Server that we're taking some time to focus on repaying technical debts and relooking into systems to have more flexibility with our code in order to make things more smooth, however a lot of these things are not necessarily "player-facing" so we will use these notes to focus on changes that you will see and experience directly within the game. As always, be sure to let us know what you think of the new changes after you've downloaded the new update, and we will continue to monitor and address them as soon as we can. Onto the notes!
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Balancing/Weapons

Weapon Balance, my old friend, it's nice to see you again! As a fun fact from our data, the three weapons that are the most requested to receive a balance pass are the Manticore, AR-55, and C-32 Bolt Action. This is something that we are always investigating and keeping tabs on behind the scenes, but after our feedback from the 3.2 patch, it seemed there were a few weapons that needed a bit more than just a damage value changed, so we've made a few more changes to lightly poke the meta to encourage a nice mix of weapons and keep things feeling fresh with your encounters. The vision that is planted in our brains here is to make sure our early game weapons feel like early game weapons without nerfing them into the ground or making them unusable in engagements with higher-geared players. However, with a TTK this short, sometimes that perfect balance can be hard to find. Having said that, minor changes are the plan for this one, let us know what you think!
Manticore (MK1 & MK2):

• Magazine size: 24 -> 22
• Headshot multiplier: 1.5 -> 1.4

AR-55(Rusty, MK1 & MK2):

• Projectile speed: 36400 -> 34200

PDW (Rusty, MK1 & MK2):

• Increased hip shot spread by 15%
• Damage falloff multiplier: 0.7 -> 0.6

C32(MK1 & MK2):

• Damage falloff multiplier: 1.0 -> 0.7

Matchmaking Changes

We've heard your feedback that something just doesn't feel quite right, and we've noticed it in our matches as well. In order to address it, we've done some deep dive investigating to answer a few questions: Is matchmaking working as intended? Is "beginner matchmaking" working properly? Now this covers a really wide range of variables and not every player's reported issue can lead to the same outlier in the way our game matchmakes, but we've made some major changes to the way our matchmaking registers and removes players on a server, to prevent server over population, which we believe should fix squad separation issues as well. We intend to continue keeping a close eye on this topic, so please don't hesitate to reach out and let us know if you experience or notice any differences!

Anti-Cheat Improvements

Fighting cheating is our number one priority, and we are aware that for some of our players the current state of the game is not ideal. As with every patch, 3.4.0 will contain various backend improvements and tweaks to our anti-cheat formula. In addition, we have added new systems to the game to help detect and prevent the kinds of cheats we have found to be the most common. While we would love to go into detail about exactly what is being changed, any info we give on our methods is unfortunately information that can be used to circumvent those methods. Regardless, we do expect that these changes should have a noticeable effect on the state of the game, and we will be monitoring them closely after they go live and adjusting them as necessary.
If you would like to contribute to the games anti-cheat efforts, reports are always one of the most useful resources at our teams disposal. Simply sending a report in-game can go a long way, and you can also make use of our #reports-and-appeals channel in our official Discord server if you would like to give some more detailed information to our anti-cheat team or would like to include a video clip with your report.
We hope these changes go a long way towards improving your experience on Fortuna, until next time Prospectors!

Changes

• Insurance payout timer has been increased from 45 minutes to 6 hours in order to combat a known item duplication exploit
  • This one is a significant change for us, and we discussed methods to address item duplication in a way that was quick and impactful. This change will ensure the game instance has shut down and all players have left the instance before dishing out insurance reimbursements.
  • Additionally and for clarity, players participating in this exploit will receive a ban if they are found to be duplicating items. Don't give into the temptation!
• We've adjusted tuning of creature proximity senses as a follow up from patch 3.3.0
• We've adjusted Crusher and Marauder aggro so that disengaging with the fiercest of terrestrial creatures isn't as difficult. No more Jeffs launching interplanetary acid bombs across the map as you run away clutching your last stim
• Storm cycles on Tharis Island have been shortened by lowering the time between storms from 25 minutes to 21 minutes to make forging feel less tedious. Duration of the storm remains unaffected
• Slightly increased the probability of receiving Progenitor Slag as a byproduct of forging from 10% to 13%
• Decreased the required amount of slags for final safe pocket upgrade from 3 to 2
• Windfall's Shop received some swanky new images to showcase item bundles

Bugfixes

• Weapon, melee, and consumable textures should no longer disappear after using a throwable consumable. For real though this time
• Fixed an out of bounds exploit above Green's Prospect Garage
• Fixed an out of bounds exploit near Osiris Research Center
• Fixed an out of bounds exploit near the lab at Rock Pools
• Fixed an out of bounds exploit at Pinnacle Labs
• Fixed an out of bounds exploit near Favela
• Fixed an out of bounds exploit near Skeleton Observation Site
• Fixed an unintended area near Waterfall Labs
• Fixed an unintended area near Korolev HQ
• Fixed an unintended area near Rock Pools
• Fixed a "stuck spot" at Root Rock Tunnel
• Fixed a "stuck spot" at Fallen Tree
• Fixed a "stuck spot" at a specific building near Hay Fields
• The Howler took a few more aviation lessons and should no longer get stuck on environmental objects
• Fixed several hiding spots that could be abused by using certain emotes in bodies of water.
• Fixed an area where players could clip through and hide on the Laser Drill
• Fixed an exploit that allowed players to climb to the top of the dungeon on Crescent Falls
• Adjusted a spawn point on Tharis Island that was a bit too close to AI creatures
• Fixed a damage mitigation bug that could occur with the Jungle Bandit archetype
• Fixed a rendering/collision issue with a vehicle in Pumpkin Fields
• Fixed an issue that allowed players to move while emoting
• Fixed an issue with some keybinds not being present when using an AZERTY keyboard. Don't get caught inspecting your weapons too often now!
• Fixed an issue that could cause the game to crash in the event a Player Report came back with an error
• Fixed a exploit regarding Free Loadout Runs and claimed insurances
• Fixed a collision issue with a tree root near Pumpkin Fields and Starport Landing Pad. We're prospectors, not termites
• Fixed an issue with a weapon's weight being affected by the ammo weight reduction perk.
• Fixed an issue with the explosive damage perk reducing damage from storm strikes and fauna damage
• Fixed a visual issue with the "Top Tiktok Howler Creators" decal on the station
• Fixed an issue where a player would be redeployed to the same map if foamed while disconnected instead of being sent back to the station
• Addressed missing localization for the "Email" textbox in the Newsletter (DE, ES, FR, IT, JP, KR. PL. PT, RU, CN)
• Fixed an issue with faulty SFX when attacking Blast Ticks with a melee weapon
• Fixed an issue with the Fortuna Pass displaying incorrect rewards when skipping levels using Aurum
• Relocated a mysterious floating rail at Favela to its proper location
• Fixed an issue with broken armor UI still showing the broken icon after being repaired
• Fixed an issue causing Error Code ## with some players when dropping
• Fixed an issue with squad separation not functioning as intended. You should only see parties of the same size deploying to the planet in Trusted Matchmaking

Known Issues & Things We Are Working On™

While some of these issues might take a bit longer, we are still investigating and aim to find fixes and address these as soon as we can.

• We are aware of your feedback that you want to see a default weapon skin setting.
• We are investigating changes to the process of selling items smoother.
• Deysnc Issues - we are cautiously keeping an eye on this topic and working with players where possible to investigate these instances.
• Getting kicked back to the lobby is currently under investigation.
• We received a bunch of reports that performance has taken a hit in Season 3 and are investigating.
• Our Welcome Packs descriptions need to be reworded to reflect the disappearance of mandatory wipes.
• Streaming tools can lead to crashes for some players.
• ​

Additionally for those of you who read our little messages at the bottom, Patch 3.5.0 is scheduled for June 28th, so no need to wonder which Wednesday it'll be! Also, you look stellar today!

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When it comes to building a swimming pool, selecting the right pool material is a crucial decision. The material you choose will not only impact the aesthetics of your pool but also determine its durability, maintenance requirements, and overall cost. With various options available, it's essential to consider your preferences, budget, and long-term goals. In this article, we will guide you through the process of choosing the perfect pool material to help you create the ideal swimming pool for your needs.

Concrete: Versatile and Customizable

Concrete is a popular choice for swimming pool construction due to its versatility and durability. It allows for endless customization options, as it can be shaped and designed according to your specific requirements. Concrete pools can accommodate various design features such as waterfalls, spas, and custom shapes. While initial construction costs may be higher compared to other materials, concrete pools offer long-term durability and can withstand harsh weather conditions. Regular maintenance, such as resealing and resurfacing, is necessary to maintain their appearance and prevent staining or cracking.

Vinyl: Affordable and Low-Maintenance

Vinyl pools are known for their affordability and low-maintenance characteristics. These pools consist of a flexible liner that is installed over a steel or polymer frame. Vinyl liners come in various patterns and designs, providing options to create a visually appealing pool. Vinyl pools are less prone to algae growth and require fewer chemicals compared to other pool materials. However, the vinyl liner may need to be replaced every 10-15 years, adding to the long-term cost. While not as customizable as concrete pools, vinyl pools offer a cost-effective and relatively hassle-free option for those seeking a budget-friendly swimming pool solution.

Fiberglass: Quick Installation and Minimal Maintenance

Fiberglass pools are pre-manufactured pools that are delivered in one piece to your property. They offer a quick installation process and require minimal maintenance. Fiberglass pools have a smooth and non-porous surface, which resists algae growth and minimizes the need for chemical treatments. Their durability and flexibility allow them to withstand shifting soil conditions. However, fiberglass pools are limited in terms of design options and sizes, as they are pre-molded. It's important to ensure proper transportation and installation to avoid any damage during the process. Fiberglass pools are an excellent choice for those looking for a low-maintenance and relatively hassle-free swimming pool option.

Natural Stone: Timeless Elegance and Unique Aesthetics

For a luxurious and visually stunning swimming pool, natural stone is an ideal choice. Natural stone materials, such as granite, limestone, or travertine, offer a timeless appeal and unique aesthetics. Each stone type possesses its own texture, color variations, and natural beauty, providing a one-of-a-kind pool design. Natural stone pools are known for their durability and can withstand harsh weather conditions. However, they require proper sealing and maintenance to prevent staining and ensure longevity. Natural stone pools are an excellent option for homeowners seeking a sophisticated and high-end pool material that adds a touch of elegance to their outdoor space.

Considerations for Choosing the Right Pool Material

When selecting the perfect pool material, there are several factors to consider. First, assess your budget and determine the initial construction cost as well as long-term maintenance expenses. Consider your desired pool design and customization options. Evaluate the durability of the material and its ability to withstand your local climate conditions. Think about the maintenance requirements and the amount of time and effort you are willing to invest in upkeep. Lastly, consider the overall aesthetics and the desired ambiance you want to create with your swimming pool.

Conclusion

When it comes to selecting the perfect pool material, one important consideration is the choice between gunite and shotcrete. Both options, which are forms of concrete, offer durability, versatility, and customization. Gunite refers to a dry mix of cement and sand that is mixed with water at the construction site, while shotcrete is a wet mix that is sprayed onto the pool structure using a hose.
Gunite and shotcrete pools are known for their strength and ability to withstand shifting soil conditions. They can be shaped and designed to match your specific preferences, allowing for creative features and customization. Both materials require proper installation and regular maintenance to ensure their longevity and appearance.
When deciding between gunite and shotcrete pool , it's important to consider factors such as budget, construction timeline, and specific project requirements. Gunite pools are typically more cost-effective and can be constructed more quickly, making them a popular choice for many homeowners. Shotcrete, on the other hand, offers a smoother finish and is often preferred for more intricate designs.
Ultimately, the choice between gunite and shotcrete for your pool material depends on your individual needs and priorities. Consulting with a professional pool builder or contractor can provide valuable insights and help you make an informed decision based on your specific circumstances.
In conclusion, whether you opt for a gunite or shotcrete pool, both materials offer durability, versatility, and the potential for a stunning swimming pool that will provide years of enjoyment and relaxation.

While playing with the original design I made I had a happy little accident and it led to development of this design by a second little happy accident in working with first build. No stabilizer, one wheel, should be enough to get you in the direction you want. I'm using the shrine rod just because I had it on hand. I suspect if you want normal rods are fine. The shrine rods are slightly longer by half a meter if you need more length for your rocker bar.
Motor must be flat to end of rod, rocker rod needs to rock to hit the chassis or another rod.
Metal bar used to rock between wheel's inputless "forward" state which causes the fan to point down and as a result, propel up. Reverse to go down, causing the bar to reverse and rock to point the motor up for downward force). The metal bars act as inhibitors - and define the range of motion (in addition to hitting the chassis at the end. Because the pinion is not inhibited you can do left and right still even when pitched down or up.
With sticking the wheel to the chassis you can affix the two limiter bars to the wheel at whatever heights you find your build needs. If you need more down or more up you can customize this by moving the bars. This is a fiddly process that is likely going to be unique to each build based on propulsion placement, balance and weight.
Untested with two props and not flight tested (let me know how it rolls if you try it). May possibly overpower the wheel with two prop fans with that much thrust.
Best part: reliable and easy to assemble. Happy steering, engineers.

(This is part of a continuing series, links to which will be provided in the comments below)
Bêafrîka State: Bob Denard, Jean-Bédel Bokassa and the mercenary state.
The term “warlord” has been abused by many as a catch all term for any armed african group. It brings to mind images of a barbaric, violent oaf seeking to enrich themselves with trinkets and money off the back of their military extortion: an example of the primitive and bloodthirsty nature of the african. This is certainly the purpose of the term for the Germans, who seek to paint all native armed resistance in this light in order to justify their own return to the continent. But despite this abuse of the term, and its unjust application, it is not made up out of whole cloth: bandits, criminal gangs and short sighted thugs do exist among the africans as they do in all people, and the chaos of the German collapse has given these characters the opportunity of a lifetime. In the former RK Zentralafrika this is seen most clearly in the “mercenary state” of Bêafrîka.
Borders of a successful Bêafrîka. Many post-colonial African nations are accused of being artificial: random lines drawn on a map for the convenience of foreigners, and thus doomed to be either failures or exploitive facades. The truth of this statement is debatable: what makes a nation “organic”, is it truly critical that one be so? Are the struggles of new African nations so easily encapsulated? The argument goes on but all will agree on this: Bêafrîka is an utterly artificial and extractive state which can only begrudgingly be called a nation at all.
The north-west of Zentralafrika has always been something of a hodgepodge. The initial conquest of the area from the Free French meant the roll back of any “nation building” expenditures in favor of reverting back to the old company rule. Corvee slavery, plantations and almost non-existent infrastructure was the rule even under the French, and as such the transition to German ownership was almost seamless. If the average native african noticed a difference at all it was in the flags and helmets of the whites who terrorized them: their managers and guards stayed essentially the same. As such the region was seen by independence agitators as ripe for their own movements to grow in. Though such resistance was kept on a tight leash by the Germans it finally burst forth in the northern incursion of 1954. Supported by Nigeria and with the German forces drawn thin by the ongoing Wester Russian War, socialist militants made a lightning strike southward in the hopes of toppling Zentralafrika. For a moment it seemed as if they would do it: the road to Leopoldville was only lightly guarded and the rebel numbers were, in theory, vast. But it was not to be: poor command structures and infighting slowed the rebel advance for long enough that Kommissar Krogmann and Seigfreid Muller were able to reorganize and counterattack with the aid of a new breed of soldier: the Mercenary.
Though having been present in the role of corporate security for years this war was the instance when the Congo Mercenaries truly became a force to be reckoned with. Restrictions on who could hold a gun were dropped and the ranks of mercs swollen with Europeans, Asians and Africans. Though typically small groups and far more independent than Krogmann would have liked, they were all well acquainted with their trade and often brought along their own equipment. They could move fast, hit hard, and there was no reason to suspect their siding with the revolutionaries. With the aid of mercenaries and the cash of selling off vast tracts of land to private holders the revolutionaries were pushed back, and the long guerilla war began. Some areas of Zentralafrika were essentially passive, or had other security solutions. But in the north it was the mercenaries and the garrison which enforced the German order. Names of these men would soon become minor celebrities to the military minded, and their benefactor Seigfreid Muller got a promotion. But for our story only three names matter: the French “mercenary king” Bob Denard, “black Napoleon” Jean-Bédel Bokassa, and “the tiger” Alexandre Banza.
Though it is the armed men who hold real power in their hands, the counter-revolutionary forces are not all German and French soldiers of fortune. The APL’s anti-clerical excesses and radical nativism also alienated the thin class of native collaborators and most of all the catholic church. Barthelemy Boganda was one such native conservative, being a native priest who has tried to act through the church to both reform and aid his flock. After the death of his mentor Marcel Grandin Boganda has become a leading figure of pro-native reform without resorting to violence or leftist radicalism.
With the alliance of French and German landowners paying for their protection the mercenaries, though still technically led by Europeans, became the foremost armed presence in the north. Battling against resistance internal and external by 1962 they have become a hated and envied force, and one which Krogmann is eager to bring into line. But the South Africa War will get in the way of any reforms, with mercenaries once again being called on to shoulder the burden of warfare and internal suppression. By the end of the conflict, no matter how it ends, the mercenaries will have become an even more entrenched force in Zentralafrika. Of course when Huttig takes over this will no longer be tolerated. Having already been humiliated by Muller before, Huttig will take great pleasure in dismissing and rounding up the mercenaries, forcing them to join his forces as regular conscripts without any special privileges. Or rather he would, if he had been fast enough to catch them. When news came of Krogmann’s death and Huttig’s assumption of control the mercenaries did not wait for the order to come: they fled if they were able, and if not they seamlessly transitioned from paid agents of the state to new warlords out for their own survival and enrichment. And more than anyone they congregated around the new king of the mercenaries: Bob Denard.
For the year Huttig’s reign lasts the gangs of former mercenaries will be yet another thorn in his side: raiding, bribing and leading his forces on goose chases. And thanks to Huttig’s destruction of any boats or airplanes he could not gain control over these same former mercenaries had nothing else they could do, unless they cared to gamble trekking all the way to Free France. But Huttig’s flailing attempts to bring them to heel was only one of many threats: in this same area socialist militants and petty warlords also sprung up, and sought to destroy the hated mercenaries themselves. When Huttig dies and the German forces retreat to Leopoldville all pretense will be dropped: the Pan-africans, Fang Gabonese and Cameroonian revolutionaries will all attempt to proclaim new states and to expel the gangsters of German capitalism for good. But with their attention divided and the mercenaries still possessing skill, fire power, and all the money the old landowners could scrap together the attempt will only be half successful. Right between the three of them the new Bêafrîka State will be proclaimed.
Born in 1929 Bob Denard first got the taste for battle during the French State’s failed expeditions against De Gaulle in the late 40s. Deciding that there was better pay and better leadership to be had in Zentralafrika he was one of the first mercenaries brought in through the “King of the Mercs” Siegfried Müller. Though he has little patience for the Reich’s racial code he is a brave commander and an ardent anti-communist. After Müller’s disappearance upon Hüttig’s ascension the stranded mercenaries looked to those bold and skilled enough to lead them, and found it in Denard.
Under the nominal presidency of Boganda, who was practically kidnaped to take the role, the new state is in perhaps the most precarious position of all post-independence states.Their domestic support rests on a incredibly thin strata of white landlords, a handful of native conservatives and a mercenary army which is already looking for a way out the back door. And opposing them is a very dedicated coalition of native nationalists and revolutionaries. It would be the most natural thing in the world for this ramshackle “state” to disintegrate. But there is one thing which can unite them, and can make them all take the risk of fighting it out: Money. Specifically diamonds, gold, and other precious metals which can be sold high on the global market. The mercenaries, native or foreign, have struck for fame in Bêafrîka with the process of becoming more than the lap dogs of the wealthy, but instead to be the wealthy themselves. Baganda hates this of course, but no one asked: the guns call the shots here. And besides, the APL has already branded him a traitor to the people: in the mercenaries' eyes he should be thankful that he still has his head. And so it is decided, the mercenaries would make their own little heaven, and all they had to do to keep it was win the war for it.
Against them stands the APL, their long-time adversary. When the war begins these Pan-africanists, supported by Cameroon and Nigeria, will take the fight to Bêafrîka. This would probably be a death sentence if it were not for the fact the APL is fighting a two front war with the Nationalists to their east. If the mercenary state should still fail it will be dismantled, with the surrounding states taking over its former territory. But if it should win this first war the gamble will have, for now, paid off. Bob, Bokassa and the rest will be able to begin bringing in the money as they use outright criminal methods to both extract and then sell the bounty of the land. The people, of course, hate this as does the nominal “president”. And within the mercenary ranks new fissures will soon begin to show. When faced with a united enemy these men were willing to work together, but now that the threat of death no longer hands quite so close the question of dividing the spoils has quickly turned into a feeding frenzy: it seems to be every mercenary clique for itself trying to carve out its own privileged fiefdom. And it is here that the reformists, such as they are, spy an opportunity.
Alexandre Banza, born 1932 to the Gbaya people, is one of the very few high ranking officers who have a ethnic connection to the land they now rule. His story is much the same as the rest of the black mercenaries: born to a poor family he saw mercenary service as a path to excitement, respect and advancement he would never get on his own. Intelligent, ambitious, and unscrupulous he would rise to become a commander of his own group before the Huttig takeover, and should he take power will rename his state the Bêafrîka Republic, embarking on a cynical campaign of “reform”.
The continued presence of white mercenaries is especially resented by the people, and none more so than commander of the presidential guard and de facto leader of the Bêafrîka State Bob Denard. As such soon after the emergency of war has passed Denard will be dismissed from his position and the two most prominent native warlords Alexandre Banza and Jean-Bédel Bokassa will be invited in to take command. Denard of course has no interest in leaving, and will arrest the president in his own residence, but not before word of the new decree leaked to the streets and the other mercenaries. So it is that the fate of Bêafrîka will be decided the only way a state built on mercenaries could be: with a shootout for control of the president. On one side is Denard: he has already made overtures to Free France and the OFN, as well as criminal contacts in Europe. By leveraging these contacts, and with the aid of the remaining white mercenaries who see his removal as the precursor to their own, he may be able to fight his way out and rise to power over the bodies of his rival warlords.
If Bob Denard and his presidential guard emerges victorious president Boganda’s days will be numbered. Unceremoniously removing and replacing him with a more compliant puppet who I will not even bother you with the name of, any promised elections will be delayed, and then delayed indefinitely. In the end even the facade of democracy will be left behind as the government instead relies on various emergency decrees and under the table deals, as well as outright coercion to cement its power. This is the true mercenary state, in which the armed and powerful take what they want from the weak and destitute: the state will see its revenues come from precious minerals and eventually oil, but just as much from the underground world of smuggling, arms trading, mercenary contracts on behalf of any who will pay, and even (if rumors are to be believed) human trafficking. Denard himself is not so unsophisticated as many of his henchmen: he portrays himself and his state as anti-communist crusaders who are willing to go to the ends of the earth to protect the people from the bolshevik menace. But it makes no difference to the people and to his neighborhood: unless those friendly to him such as the Free French and the Belgian regionalists are victorious both Denard and his state will find themselves facing external invasion sooner or later. When that happens, surrounded by disciplined enemies and facing ever increasing internal revolts, Denard will do what mercenaries do best: he will gather what valuables and guns he can before fleeing. But if this should not happen: if the Congo should remain shattered, and Nigerian ambitions fail, who knows how long the dream may last?
Living as they do in a half criminal status all mercenaries are well acquainted with the underworld. Under Bob however the state itself will come to resemble a crime syndicate, with Bob acting as the Mafia boss. More than any other single resource diamonds are the breadwinner for the “White King of Bêafrîka”, but taking a page out of Manchuria’s playbook drug production and trafficking are increasingly filling the ledger as well. The diplomatic denouncements are nothing: there are always back doors which money can open.
But all this is only if Bob and his people should win the battle for President Boganda. For the first time having the full backing of the streets and with a larger manpower pool to draw from it is likely that the native warlords Alexandre Banza and Jean-Bédel Bokassa will become the victors, chasing out the (competition) colonizers in favor of their own rule. They shall of course be rewarded by the eternally thankful president for their good deeds: Bokassa will take over as the new head of the presidential guard, while Banza will become minister of finance and foreign minister. But just as inevitably there is no throne on earth big enough for two people and so the former allies will soon look for a way to oust the other. The hope of the civilians lay in the victory of the Alexandre Banza clique. If he should succeed in arresting and disappearing his rivals Banza will seek to somewhat moderate the state. Rather than rely on naked coercion he will enforce the most basic of social contracts: in return for the country's obedience he will provide protection. Though the basic facts of the Bêafrîka State shall remain: a thriving underground, an economy based on raw export, and a army of criminals, the worst aspects of this rule will be softened and the “civilianization” of government give cosmetic reform to the regime, and finally permit the nominal president a level of dignity, even being allowed to push some of his catholic inspired social reforms. Though not much more than swapping a military uniform for a business suit this will go some way to providing a sense of normalcy, and allow the state to take a non-aligned stance rather than become the plaything of some foreign power.
On the other hand is the favorite of the soldiers Jean-Bédel Bokassa. You know him as the “mad” emperor of the C.A.R. otl, but there was always a method to his madness: one cannot remain in power for over a decade by being stupid. Where Banza seeks to normalize his regime and to be seen as a developmental junta rather than a warlord, Bokassa will lean into his reputation as a warlord, adding esoteric elements to bolster his rule over strangers. Under Bokassa the new system will be entirely personal: he will take the already weak state apparatus and effectively dismantle it, instead relying on personalized dependents to govern the capital city, and leaving the remainder of the country to its own devices so long as it bent the knee when ordered. No longer able to convincingly portray himself as a benign figure to a people who are mostly foreigners to him, he will instead tap into local superstitions to appear as the master of the occult, ruling as a man to be feared even beyond the grave and allegedly indulging in cannibalism. Perhaps even more importantly however he will make a hard switch from western backing to eastern, seeking the protection and the money of Japan. In this at least he will be fairly competent: negotiating the relationship with Japan through a mixture of bribery, utility, and threatened confiscations to wring out as much foreign aid and diplomatic backing as he can. Beyond this his rule will be one of chaos and decline with the people seeing their standard of living decrease yet further to a near subsistence level. But it will be a chaos which Bokassa alone is the ruler of.
Jean-Bédel Bokassa has been fighting longer than most: volunteering for the Free French during WW2, he was captured and ultimately released during the German conquest of Gabon. From there he drifted as a menial laborer until the northern insurrection forced the Reichskommissar to bend, and Bokassa was called up by an old french commander. From there he rose to be the de-facto head of his own suit by 1962, and now the undisputed leader of his own fiefdom. The extreme personalism and close relation with Japan will eventually result in his coronation as the sovereign of the Central African Empire.
Whether it be cynical pragmatism or esoteric terror the Bêafrîka State will remain a pariah among their fellow african nations. Cameroon and Gabon will consistently attempt to undermine and take over their territory for themselves, while even the Germans will see any government as traitors and rebels. Though its military may find a backer and its people may become cowed, the incredibly fragile state will come to an end sooner than later, unless they get very lucky. Any Nigerian victory will be a disaster, but a successful unifyer to the south and east would be a great threat as well. They were already founded in the war against one of those potential unifiers and all contenders for power recognize that a united Congo is a dangerous Congo. So, either through direct aid in the case of Denard or cheering from the sidelines Bêafrîka must hope for the victory of the regionalists and Jean Schramme.
Katanga, the Regional Alliance, and “The Belgian”.
For the Pan-Africans, the Republicans, the Nationalists and even the Germans survival is not enough: they wish to reunite the old Belgian colony under their vision of the future, and perhaps even seek expansion beyond that. But not all “congolese” feel this way: in particular the province of Katanga sees no reason why it should not be free to plot its own course. Wealthy in its own right with economic ties to the south the elite of the mining provence see no reason why they should be chained to a central government, and are at least partially supported in this by the people. Just what future this “independence” takes is is still up for grabs, but in the chaotic aftermath of Huttings death Moïse Tshombe, Albert Kalonji and Jean Schramme will form a triumvirate to lead the Regional Alliance.
Élisabethville slum. Katanga is the richest province in the Congo, as well as the one with the highest concentration of Belgians, and as such has seen the beginning of a modern city develop in its capital. It has also been the prime region for victims of the Congo Dam to migrate into, on account of its relative stability and high labor demand. This has all combined to put a great deal of pressure on those populating the land south of the lake and the development of modern slums alongside the growing city.
Katanga is, in 1962, the last remnant of Belgian colonial rule left after the German takeover. Not formally of course, that had been swept away along with Belgum itself in the 50s. But just beneath the German surface the old colonial trinity of church, company and stick still held true, and mostly under Belgian control. In the aftermath of WW2 and the establishment of Burgundy many Belgians had chosen to migrate into their old colonial territory, either for political or economic reasons. Their numbers would soon fill out the officer ranks of the Force Publique, the managerial posts of various new mines and plantations, and the pews of the catholic church. But it would not be the end of their difficulties: the old trinity clashed with Krogmann’s designs for the colony and after formally absorbing it in 1955 the contest began. Where the catholic church once held near total control over healthcare and education, not to mention religious life, Krogmann favored secularism for the european and promoted dechristianization for the native. His hopes for dissolving the FP and for removing french and dutch from the lexicon would be similarly resisted. By 1962 this contest of wills has continued to grind on, with the steady advance of germanization being constantly interrupted by economic and political expediency. The Belgian Katangaians find themselves stuck uncomfortably between German pressure from above and Native pressure from below.
This native pressure is on one hand from the educated evoles, always looking to improve the lot of themselves and sometime of their kin. But it also increasingly comes from the restless masses who have come under pressure from the fallout of the Congo Dam. As the Belgian congo moderately prospered the cities began to grow as well, with the colonial authorities making tentative attempts to accommodate the influx. But after the Congo dam and the German takeover both of these trends changed. Millions of refugees fled the great flood into the wealthiest regions they could go: Leopoldville and Katanga. The population of the cities exploded, and the subsistence agriculture still practiced by most Congolese came under incredible pressure as migrants and squatters proliferated. The Belgian authorities meanwhile were left without the resources needed to truly accommodate this change, and were left with only the Force Publique to try and keep the “indigenes” separate from the new “foreigners”. It was in this context that regionalist associations with the goal of protecting specific people, such as the Lula or Lunda, came to dominate the native political scene, such as it was. Both of these movements discovered that they had similar enemies: both resented German power and feared the “national” native resistance. But this did not yet mean they became allies.
Moïse Tshombe, the nominal head of Katanga. Born to a noble lineage and always wealthy, his desire to be liked and his lack of spin have made him into an ideal puppet for other interests. His current sponsor is the remnants of the old Belgian Union Minière, which comprise much of Katanga’s economy. Though not hated by any “his” government is in reality more beholden to his lieutenants such as Godefroid Munongo.
Katanga had lived in an atmosphere of tension even before the rise of Huttig and the advent of the “Afrikareich” did nothing to alleviate this tension. As part of Huttig’s program to fully disarm the natives and bring all armed forces under SS command he attempted to disarm the Force Publique and Belgian mercenaries, rolling them into its own armed forces. Prominent civilian Belgians were arrested and replaced with SS men, leaving both the Belgians and the natives angered. Under this new pressure some decided to give it up: the new regime could not be bargained with as the prior one was, and any resistance clearly meant death. But enterprising elements were not willing to take death laying down: most prominently this included Godefroid Munongo and Jean Schramme. Using their own wealthy connections and estates as payment they would form small resistance groups, and would be the first formal alliance between the Belgians and the regionalists. To cut a long story short when Huttig dies and the Germans retreat to Leopoldville, those SS governors who do not flee will find their lifespans much shorter than expected, and those brave or desperate enough to resist Huttig will return to power. In the face of nationalist calls to reunite the congo however, the regionalists will move first. With the lavish bribery of local mining conglomerates and the justification of “popular will”, the Belgian community led by Schramme and localist leaders will form the first concret result of their ad-hoc alliance: The State of Katanga.
In its first years Katanga is a divided and unsettled place, forced into unity by the common fear of external subjugation but beholden to competing political camps. The state itself is at least nominally led by Moïse Tshombe, descendant of the kings of the Lunda people and scion to one of the last wealthy native families. He is the figurehead of a poorly organized class of native elites and collaborators, most often independently wealthy and committed just as much to their own economic privileges as they are to the cause of regionalism itself. But despite this Tshombe heads the closest thing to a “popular movement” in the new state: the "Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga" (CONAKAT). Formed in the interest of protecting the livelihoods of the Lunda against the encroaching migrants it is through this party that the people are mobilized for war. Relying on traditional authority and elite connections in the name of a tribalism has been effective in at least countering the partisans of the republicans and nationalists which contest the provence. Just as in the other contenders the war is as much a mater of internal division as it is defeating external challenges. But in order to meet those external enemies the party has been obliged to do so with the aid of their “ally”, the Belgians.
Jean Schramme, despite his official profession, is less of a mercenary and more of a Belgian “contractor” who has a reputation for getting things done and resisting German encroachment. Coming to Africa soon after the end of WW2 he is part of a new breed of Belgians who consider Zentralafrika, or more accurately Katanga, as their true home and embrace the ideal of a paternal ruler of their “primitive” neighbors. Being a successful entrepreneur as well as part time leader of the “Leopard Battalion” Jean has become a prominent part of the Belgian expat community. But though he no longer wishes to return to Europe do not think he has forgotten what the Nazi’s did: the old motherland is dead by German hands, and he has not forgiven them.
Just as on the native side the Belgians are divided internally: German policy was frustrating and insulting, but it was also relatively stable and offered a protection against the natives surrounding them. To forgo this protection and risk battle with the world's superpowers in the name of an uncertain independence requires a boldness uncommon in men. But since when did the meek make history? Returning from his armed exile Schremme will find the FP and Belgian police in disarray, and take it upon himself to topple the last of the SS governors. In his mind there is no question: in order for the Belgians to be free and prosperous they must take the risk of rebellion against Germany and carve out their own state in the chaos. But despite his personal exploits he is unable to do this on his own, and so despite his personal distaste for allying with the native regionalists his own backers in the belgian mining and administrative class have forced him to make common cause with “their” evolese. Regardless Schremme has become the critical belgian commander in this rebelion, bringing the remainder of the belgian community with him whether they like it or not. He leads in a mercenary style, never far from the front lines and with a greater emphasis on personal bravery than more mundane things like logistics.
Though Katanga is the heart of the Regionalist Alliance it is still only one part of that alliance: to the eastern flank is Sud-Kasaï, led by Albert Kalonji as the vanguard state of the Luba secessionist movement. Both Kalonji and Tshombe claim to be protecting their people (Luba and Lunda respectively) from becoming minorities within their own land and from becoming the playthings of another foreign power, whether that be Germania, Washington or any other place. They are also both from prominent and wealthy local families, who have cooperated with the belgian colonizers for generations and have every personal incentive to resist foreign acquisition. As such their support is not primarily from the people, but from the oligarchs and the army. These are two significant advantages however: While other factions are scrambling to put together a military, a state, and to pay for it all, Katanga and her allies are able to fall back on the old colonial power structures, expanding the FP and leveraging oligarchical ties to slap together an army faster than their rivals. With the mix of audacious leadership, money and the Schramme loyalist mercenaries/formed FP officers the alliance may be able to snatch its independence despite the lack of international backing.
Map of regionalist victory, Azandeland acts as a placeholder for local authority (or lack thereof), Sud-Kasai is the Luba Empire. The immediate issue facing the regionalists will be export access: the states survival depends on the revenue from its extensive mining operations, and if that material cannot be exported it is worthless. For this Katanga must either negotiate a trade deal with the German remnants, or seek a detente with the self proclaimed frontline of liberation Zambia. Neither is eager to do this, but the world calls for what Katanga can provide, most of all Uranium. Eventually the market will win out, and one side will decide it is better to compromise principle than give the other an opportunity to gain access to the Katanga bounty.
IF VICTORIOUS the Regionalist Alliance will comprise an expanded State of Katanga, the Luba Empire, and a number of minor eastern powers propped up by Katanga. For the Luba and the Eastern chiefs the question of post war politics is an easy one: tribal traditionalism shall prevail as Albert Kalonji names himself king and the local chiefs are either bribed or threatened into compliance with the new order. While some may make efforts to modernize and advance their domains it will only be done under the watchful and occasionally helpful eye of Katanga. The only question remaining is who will be in control of Katanga itself. Jean Schramme is not a reasonable man, or at least not a moderate one: if he feels that he and the Belgians are not granted their proper place he may well try to overthrow Moïse Tshombe and install himself as the leader of the new state. The natives are less than satisfied as well: though free of foreign control it is clear to them that the old order is no longer acceptable: the people who fought and won the war for independence demand that their sacrifice be rewarded in some meaningful way. And most of all the question of race can no longer be papered over: The Belgians and Europeans remain on top, the migrants have been savaged, and the land and jobs available are not enough to satisfy them all.
To reconcile these internal difficulties a conference shall be held between the Belgian leadership of the army and company's one on hand, and the native oligarchs and officers on the other to see if a viable solution can be worked out. On the Belgian side the question is that of security and property: they wish to maintain the full roster of legal rights granted to them by belgian law, to keep their property and company concessions, and for a Belgian “veto” in the national government to ensure that Belgian rights are not trampled by some future populist government. On the CONAKAT side is a desire to renegotiate the terms of the “social contract”: to ensure a majority native voice in government which cannot be overruled by Belgian privilege, greater native ownership of property and the full abolition of any legal barriers to their advancement. However both sides are united in seeking stability and in their distrust of the congolese “masses”. Those masses are not without a voice themselves: through labor unions, dissident political parties and new officer associations the experience of warfare has made the people politically aware. If the result of the conference does not give some bones to the people it may find that its support is far too narrow to be stable.
Union Minière, once the undisputed master of the Katanga economy, has declined somewhat under German overlordship. With a majority of its shares owned by the Belgian state and its former leadership fleeing to America after the end of the war its foundations were shaky. When Krogmann began the great sell off and rescinded the Belgian Congo’s autonomy the company found itself in yet more hot water. Transitioning to a locally owned company within Zentralafrika itself the Union has been forced to cut back on its paternalistic spending to make ends meet. Beyond the typical demands for labor rights and wage increases the Kantaga people also wish for a return to the housing, education and social protection once afforded by the leviathan. With its place in Katanga once again secure this may just be possible.
A successful conference will be one of compromise. For the people a number of social protections and laws will be promised: greater state funding to education, hospitals, and housing will be promised, along with a hike in wages. In order to afford this the belgians will need to accept their privileged economic position comes with a responsibility to fund the state which protects it: though direct taxes may be a bridge too far a system of expected “gifts” and an expansion of the old paternalism into state guided policy may work out. In return for their material contributions the Belgians will receive legal autonomy, organizing their own political parties and keeping their land. The native oligarchs meanwhile would take the national stage, being granted privileged places within the Katanga economy as well as using CONAKAT as their vehicle for political dominance. Concessions and compromises such as these require that all parties trust the other to keep up their end of the bargain, and not simply alter the deal when they feel they are able. And in the aftermath of a brutal civil war and a political culture of corruption such trust is very hard to come by. But if these difficulties are overcome, and Jean Schramme is kept mollified, the new State of Katanga will be ruled as a collaborative oligarchy, keeping real representation out of the hands of the people and wealth in the hands of a few, but also a relatively stable and moderate government which is willing to compromise when need be. Unless it is a question of distrusted ethnic groups attempting to secede from the state or restart Congolese unification, in which case the Katanga Gendarmerie will be the only answer given.
But what if this conference does not succeed? What if the protests outside become too large, or the sides are too inflexible, or if Jean Schramme believes the rights of Belgians are being sold too cheaply? Then the Rule of Fire will come back and those with the force to crush their opposition will prevail. And in Katanga that can only mean one thing: Schramme and his allies will stage a coup, placing themselves in charge once again as an emergency government. Those unwilling to ally with him will be dismissed, replaced with those who are. The new mission of the state is the protection of “Belgian civilization” in Katanga, with Schramme attempting to revive the old trinity of Church, State and Company under his guiding hand. He never truly wanted to be in this position: he would much rather simply go back to his plantation and be master of his own little world. But he belives that his new homeland calls out for leadership and guts it seems only he can provide, and so he will seek to lead it into the future he envisions. One where the Congo natives are grateful and subservient to their betters, where all the structures of the trinity are led by Europeans to the benefit of all. Of course most of the natives have very different ideas about what the future should look like, and so Schremma’s Katanga will immediately be thrown into a bush war as the old civil war factions reform as guerrilla movements seeking to topple his dictatorship. The profits of Katanga are vast, especially if one is willing to sell uranium to anyone willing to buy, but how long will money and determination be able to hold against the will of the people?
At a stretch the white population of Katanga is 100,000, while the total african population is somewhere north of 1.5 million. This is before one considers the increasing populations of the Luba Empire and the eternal frontier of the Eastern Congo. And then there is the highly likely presence of hostile regimes on the borders: all the money in the world cannot win Schramme this Bush War, and he will either need to swallow his pride and accept democratization for the natives or accept the return of the Reich as suzerain. And even that may not be enough to avoid the rage of a people betrayed.

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Planning to build a swimming pool is an exciting endeavor, but it's essential to have a clear understanding of the costs involved. Estimating the cost of your ideal swimming pool is crucial to ensure you can budget appropriately and make informed decisions. This article serves as a comprehensive guide to help you navigate the process of estimating the cost of your dream pool.

Determining Pool Type and Design

Before diving into cost estimation, it's important to determine the type and design of your swimming pool. Consider the following factors:
Researching different pool types:
Explore options such as concrete, fiberglass, or vinyl pools to find the one that best suits your preferences and budget.
Exploring various pool designs and sizes:
Consider the size and shape of the pool, whether you prefer a traditional rectangular pool, a freeform design, or something unique.
Considering additional features and customization options:
Think about the extras you envision for your pool, such as water features, lighting, slides, or spas, as these can affect the overall cost.

Factors Influencing Pool Cost

Several factors influence the cost of building a swimming pool. Understanding these factors will help you estimate the expenses accurately:
Pool size and shape:
Larger and more complex pools generally require more materials and labor, which can increase the overall cost.
Construction materials and labor:
The choice of materials, such as the type of pool shell, tile, coping, and decking, will impact the cost. Labor costs for construction and installation should also be considered.
Excavation and site preparation:
The condition of your site, accessibility, and the amount of excavation and preparation required can affect the cost.
Pool equipment and accessories:
Pool equipment, such as pumps, filters, heaters, and automation systems, add to the total cost. Additional accessories like pool covers or cleaning systems should also be factored in.
Landscaping and hardscaping:
The cost of landscaping around the pool area, including plants, trees, paving, and outdoor structures, should be considered if you desire a complete backyard oasis.

Budgeting for Pool Construction

Once you have an idea of the pool type, design, and influencing factors, it's time to establish a realistic budget:
Setting a realistic budget:
Assess your financial capabilities and determine the maximum amount you are willing to invest in your pool project.
Obtaining multiple quotes:
Seek quotes from reputable pool contractors to get a better understanding of the potential costs involved. Compare the quotes and evaluate the breakdown of expenses.
Allocating funds for contingencies:
It's advisable to allocate a portion of your budget for unexpected expenses or contingencies that may arise during construction.

Additional Costs and Considerations

Estimating the cost of your ideal swimming pool goes beyond just the construction expenses. Consider the following additional costs and considerations:
Pool permits and approvals:
Research the permits and approvals required by your local authorities, as they may involve certain fees.
Pool fencing and safety features:
Depending on local regulations, you may need to install safety features such as pool fencing or alarms, which add to the overall cost.
Pool maintenance and ongoing expenses:
Factor in the cost of regular pool maintenance, including water treatment, cleaning, and potential repairs or replacements of equipment over time.
Energy efficiency considerations and costs:
Explore energy-efficient options for pool equipment, such as variable-speed pumps or solar heating, which may have higher upfront costs but can lead to long-term savings.

Case Studies: Examples of Pool Costs

To provide a practical perspective, let's consider a few case studies illustrating different pool costs:
Case study 1: Small fiberglass pool installation:
A small fiberglass pool with basic features may cost between $30,000 and $40,000, including excavation, installation, and basic landscaping.
Case study 2: Large custom concrete pool construction:
A large custom concrete pool with intricate design elements, advanced features, and extensive landscaping can range from $80,000 to $150,000 or more.
Case study 3: Medium-sized vinyl liner pool installation:
A medium-sized vinyl liner pool with standard features may cost between $25,000 and $35,000, depending on the complexity of the design and additional options.

Financing Options for Pool Construction

If your budget falls short, various financing options can help make your pool dreams a reality:
Loans or home equity:
Research financing options such as personal loans or home equity loans to bridge the financial gap.
Local incentives or rebates:
Explore if there are any local incentives or rebates available for energy-efficient pool installations, as they can help offset some costs.
Consider long-term costs and return on investment:
While the upfront cost of your ideal swimming pool is important, also consider the long-term savings from energy efficiency and the potential increase in property value.

Conclusion

Estimating the cost of your ideal swimming pool, particularly when considering a gunite pool, is a crucial step in planning your pool project. A gunite pool offers durability, customization options, and long-term value, but it's important to have a clear understanding of the associated costs.
By determining the pool type and design, considering factors that influence pool cost, budgeting for pool construction, and accounting for additional expenses, you can develop a realistic estimation for your gunite pool.
When estimating gunite pool cost, factors such as pool size, construction materials, labor, excavation, equipment, and landscaping all contribute to the overall expenses. It's essential to set a realistic budget, obtain multiple quotes from reputable pool contractors, and allocate funds for potential contingencies.
In the case of a gunite pool, the cost can vary significantly depending on the size, design complexity, and additional features desired. While a small to medium-sized gunite pool may range from $50,000 to $100,000, larger and more elaborate designs can exceed $100,000.
Exploring financing options, such as loans or home equity, can help make your gunite pool a reality, ensuring you can bring your dream pool to life within your budget constraints. It's also important to consider the long-term costs and return on investment, as a gunite pool offers durability and potential energy efficiency savings over time.
In conclusion, estimating the cost of your ideal swimming pool, specifically a gunite pool, is crucial for effective planning and decision-making. By considering all relevant factors, conducting thorough research, obtaining professional advice, and creating a realistic budget, you can embark on the journey of building your dream gunite pool. With careful estimation and budgeting, you can create a stunning and enduring pool that brings joy, relaxation, and value to your home for many years to come.